We have a problem: Due to the shortening average lives of products and the fast growing variety of products in the marketplace, the cash flow from an increasing number of (manufacturer-owned), branded products is no longer able to either cover their current marketing cost or to recoup the front-end investment in them. The solution for brand owners is to reverse the relationship between their brands and their products: No longer should a brand be a function of a product, rather, products must now be managed as functions of a brand. What makes this solution realisable is that with a brand you can do anything you like. Almost.
Looking into the future, it is tempting to believe that markets, increasingly, will become 'globalised' and it is even more tempting to believe that therefore there is hope for standardised products in international markets. These temptations, I would urge, must be resisted for two reasons: It is wrong to assume that all markets (I mean the markets for all kinds of products and services) will show a detectable tendency to globalise. Some products and services are already in global markets. It is wrong to assume that a tendency for a consumption pattern to become global means that you can invariably meet it with a standardised product offering. Ford motor cars are a very good example of this approach to product design and manufacture. So my conclusion is that global markets will gradually continue to emerge, but that that does not invariably mean that a standardised product offering is appropriate.
The strategic planning process has changed very significant since the early 1970s. Planning has changed in terms of scope (it needs to encompass a mere diverse range of publics) in terms of time span (the need fox' greater flexibility dictates shorter time spans), and in terms of priorities (evaluative elements have taken precedence over statistical procedures). The paper's main emphasis is on the changes in planning since 1974 why they came about, what they are, why they nearly led to a rejection of the whole concept of planning, and bow management is now coping with them. In conclusion, the paper draws inferences about the contribution to be made by marketing research.
Management information systems are still designed to monitor internal historical events rather than to scan the business environment for future opportunities. This paper identifies the specific abilities which companies must have to survive during the 1980s and it draws inferences for the architecture and management of information systems to enable those abilities to be developed. The paper concludes by suggesting a number of specific ways in which marketing researchers could serve the future needs of business.
This paper is written by a management consultant; one who, by the nature of his task, must try to know, develop and fertilise the soil on which managerial talent in business can grow and bear fruit. One vital constituent of that soil is action-provoking information. The author gives his views on the increasingly important role of information as a business asset and his reasons for those views. He then describes the very imperfect supply and demand situation in which business information finds itself. The objectives which business information must meet having been set out, the prevailing obstacles to a more fruitful relationship between the ultimate user if information â the business decision-maker â and the non-integrated, heterogeneous host of production-oriented suppliers are examined. The author concludes that an Edwardian outlook on information management in business is common and that little encouragement to a more up-to-date approach is forthcoming from the Information supply side.